Artsakh Defense Army Counteroffensive was Suspended by Moscow’s Mediation
Interview with Artur Martirosyan of Boston, senior advisor to CM & Partners Company.
–Mr. Martirosyan, upon bilateral agreement it was announced on cease-fire along the entire Nagorno Karabakh—Azerbaijan Line of Contact on April 5, however, up to day Azerbaijan continues shooting, victims and wounded are recorded every single day. How do you assess the existent situation, what did instigate Aliyev, although partially, suspend the fire?
–The USA, Russia and the EU possess sufficient tools to restrain more serious actors, than Azerbaijan. However, the latter agreed on cease-fire due to another reason, i.e. another defeat and the perspective for losing new territories. Aliyev’s blitzkrieg was doomed to failure, and counteroffensive of Artsakh Defense army was suspended by Moscow’s mediation.
This is the reason that Byul Byul didn’t manage to appear in the role of a hawk, and together with his leader, he had to spread fake information, that operations by Aliyev’s militants are counteroffensive. This lie is bonded with such simple white threads, that not a single reasonable person will believe. In any case, mediators, at least publicly, continue calling on both sides avoid implementation of force. By that, they legitimate Aliyev’s lie, as if it wasn’t clear who’s initiator of the escalation, and as if both sides bear the same responsibility.
–You mentioned that Moscow interfered with advancing of Armenian forces. What’s the role of Moscow in the “four-day war”? A standpoint is existent, that is was beneficial to the very Moscow.
–This follows from the logic of developments. Cease-fire was agreed in Moscow between heads of general headquarters in Moscow, after mediation of president Putin. It occurred on the very moment when the Armenian side took counteroffensive steps, and objectively Aliyev is more interested in ceasefire for the time being, as it helps to save his image by totally false grounding, that Azerbaijani actions have been counteroffensive. I don’t insist, that Russia saved Aliyev, however, that mediation was beneficial to him from tactical standpoint. That would be beneficial to us, if on the very first day Russia and other mediators sharply put an end to Aliyev’s actions and called things by their proper names.
– RA president stated in a meeting with OSCE MG Co-chairs, that all units should return to the positions and barracks before April 1, 2016. Is it sufficient, after likewise aggression by the adversary and recorded tens of victims and wounded soldiers? In your opinion, who should negotiate now and from which positions and what should be negotiated? Should the 1994 agreement be maintained or a new document is necessary?
–The worst that may happen now, is giving a chance to Aliyev to digest this military operation. Return to the former status quo is inadmissible for the reason, that the 1994 agreement doesn’t comply with the new realities, to the alignment of forces and new technical possibilities of fighting, and doesn’t contain points on acting mechanisms of ceasefire maintenance. A new accord is necessary to reach, with new terms, in which all the parties but Azerbaijan are interested, as only Azerbaijan considers military settlement possible. New accord is impossible without NK participation in the process. Moreover, on account of the new realities, without NK participation, continuation of any negotiations will be useless repetition of negotiations imitation.
–RA president assigned to develop an agreement with NK, what will it provide? Some officials in Armenia raise the issue of recognition of Artsakh Republic, what is the most proper time for it?
–De jure registration of de facto evidence is an impetus to the mediators and the adversary, that recognition of NKR by Armenia will be inevitable in case of another escalation of the situation, and this is the last step in this direction. Moreover, I’d consider that step the last touchstone of CSTO vitality. After such agreement is concluded, the possibility of maneuvering and avoiding responsibility by Russia and other participants will be equalized to zero: in that case attack on Karabakh will mean attack on Armenia, with all its implications of that military-political accord. Meanwhile recognition of NKR is equal to disruption of negotiations, and we don’t need it for a range of reasons. On account of our interests, the issue must be set this way: what change will we record after the recognition?
It’ll be a positive shift, if besides Armenia, NKR is recognized by other countries as well. Otherwise, unilateral recognition will mostly have negative implications. In this case we should be guided not by facts of sensitive symbolism, bit that of political realism. What shift will be recorded for Karabakh in case of official unilateral recognition from the standpoint of security and development perspectives?
– A few official visits to the region have been recorded recently—OSCE MG Co-chairs, RF Prime Minister and MFA. What results may be anticipated?
–“The four-day war” showed that blitzkrieg is impossible, and only a wide-scale war is possible. And the latter isn’t in line with the interests of the trio—the USA, Russia and the EU. Are they ready for steps to urge Azerbaijan agree on terms of the new accord on cease-fire? This depends on many factors. The first practical steps by mediator countries will show how far they’re able to go, not to permit new escalation.
–I ask you to compare investment of ceasefire regime maintenance international mechanism by the USA and proposals of deploying a peacekeeping mission by Russia. What purpose do they pursue—peace in the region, or possibility of influence intensification?
–These issues haven’t been finally developed neither by form, nor by content. It’s clear that out of its personal interests, Russia isn’t against assuming an exclusive role of deploying a peacekeeping mission. However, this is hardly possible or necessary. The variant of international observation mission is more realistic. The US proposal to current realities is more proper. The available technologies provide the opportunity to control through unmanned aerial vehicles on the Line of Contact.
However, this variant brings forward a range of issues regarding cease-fire maintenance. Technically miscellaneous solutions are possible, however, the point is, for instance, what will happen in case for ceasefire violation, i.e. what implications cease-fire violation may bring to the violating side. Even if mediators should express their concern, we’d better totally refuse that system. The violating side should bear serious, clearly defined ad real responsibility. Any variant, except the first one, will push out military alternative from negotiations, which, no doubt, is in line with interests of the Armenian side, as it’ll impose Azerbaijan refrain from the strategy of exhausting war and will return him to the negotiation table, not from the position of fake force, but from actual situation.
–The US sharply criticizes Aliyev, especially the leading media outlets. Is this a pressure over Azerbaijan? And was uncovering of Aliyev’s offshore liaison by the international consortium of journalistic investigation accidental?
–Corruption of Aliyev’s bandit regime has never been a secret for the USA and other actors. The “Panama papers” is only the top of the iceberg. It hindered neither the USA nor the EU to reach their geo-political purposes, and they aren’t limited by energy transfer, and aren’t hidden behind the rhetoric of human rights and democracy, which lack and may not be existent in the hereditary authoritarianism in the Sultan regime.
And after the US Congress adopts the package of imposing sanctions on Aliyev, we may speak of real and practical policy again. Up to now these are simple talks. And Aliyev knows this, that’s why he attempts imposing his own game to external players, like Erdogan. We can’t say he didn’t record success in this direction. We should be interested in what Aliyev and other parties do, first and foremost, what we do, i.e. what has or hasn’t been implemented, that allowed Aliyev to go to this escalation, and what lessons we learnt from the “four-day war.”
In any case, one point is clear, Armenia and Artsakh should rely only on resources of our population in opposing Azerbaijan and Turkey, accordingly, any postponing of changes providing progressive development is pregnant with new challenges and inadmissible losses for us.
By Gayane Khachatryan
