“Time Works for Azerbaijan”
Armen Badalyan, political and election technologies’ expert, analyst, is the interviewee of 168.am.
–Mr. Badalyan, Eduard Sharmazanov, RPA speaker, denied the circulating news that at Nuclear Security Summit to be held from March 31 to April 1 in Washington, the meeting of presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan—Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev will take place. To your mind, what may we expect from Serzh Sargsyan’s visit?
-No result will be recorded, he’ll go and participate in it, and meet with those he’ll succeed, and that’s it.
–Even if it’s not initially announced, the two presidents will be in Washington; won’t the meeting really take place?
-To all probabilities, it won’t occur. It’s not compulsory, if they appear in the United States, they should meet one another or other instances. It’s rather complicated there, they are not tourists there to meet accidentally in the street, sit in the bench and chat for 5 minutes.
–How do you explain the fact that the USA exerts efforts on investment of international mechanism of maintenance of ceasefire on Karabakh conflict zone, and there is no reflection by Russia in this regard?
-OSCE co-chairs have varying approach regarding Karabakh issue, each of them is lead by its own interest, and, accordingly, as these interests aren’t in line, no result will be recorded. Currently the US has its own interest that the situation temporarily remained unchanged, maybe till the end of election campaign and etc., after which they’ll decide what to do. And Russia has its interests, maybe it doesn’t intend to fix on existent situation with Azerbaijan, especially when Azerbaijan purchases large volumes of weaponry, and there are business interests there, i.e. everyone has its interests, it’s quite a normal phenomenon.
–In any case, we may suppose that the US president Barak Obama will discuss the issue of that mechanism with Aliyev, do you see any possibility that Aliyev will agree to invest it at last?
-If it’s in line with the interests of Azerbaijan—yes, if not, then—no. Naturally, Azerbaijan understands that if in this situation the mechanism will be implemented, it may give ground to indirectly suppose, that it recognizes those territories as under Armenia’s control, which may have such a status. And Azerbaijan doesn’t agree on it, why it should agree not to implement ceasefire in its territory? In the end, let’s not forget, de jure, they are territories under Azerbaijan. And naturally enough, Azerbaijan is against implementation of some additional mechanisms by Armenia. Turns out, Armenia both occupies those regions and invests some mechanisms, so that Azerbaijan doesn’t try to liberate its territories.
Accordingly, from the standpoint of Azerbaijan, it turns out that it’s rather logical, that the latter denies that mechanism.
–However, Iran’s factor has emerged, and the USA needs stability in the region.
-Anyway, stability exists, as wide-scale military actions haven’t been imposed; just border sharpening linked to this or that event, visit of this or that official, or discussion of NKR issue in this or that platform. So that, stability is mainly maintained, and Iran isn’t a Minsk group co-chair and its opinion can’t be considered.
–Isn’t it the factor of the two countries being immediate neighbors? Iran used to have its active participation in the settlement of Karabakh conflict.
-It’s not essential. Turkey is also an immediate neighbor to some extent, however, Armenia doesn’t agree that Turkey was engaged with Minsk group. Then, it won’t be beneficiary not only for Azerbaijan, but Minks group co-chairs: the USA, Russia and France, that Iran was engaged with it, as it’s a new actor, and they’re not going to tell the whole history of past 25 years, so that it put forward it interests. Three co-chairs hardly combine their interests, and they don’t need to combine them with Iran either.
–Actually what implication may investment of international mechanism for maintenance of ceasefire have?
-Basically it won’t provide any result, as even if they invest it, and Azerbaijan violates that system, what should they do against Azerbaijan? Impose sanctions? Azerbaijan is becoming one of gas supplying countries to the EU with its gas structures, soon it’ll exploit Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and will channel Central Asia and Far East with Europe, and the latter, naturally, isn’t intended to strain its relations with Azerbaijan and, at best, if they invest the system and Azerbaijan violates it, they should say, don’t violate the established regime, but thinking that in case of violation serious implications will follow Azerbaijan—not. Tensions on border, blockade, absence of commercial links, these are all after-effects, and the reason is unsettlement of NKR issue. If the issue is settled, everything will disappear. Illness should be cured, and not implications of illness. It’s impossible.
–However, the situation seems to be blocked; Azerbaijan doesn’t agree on anything, and Armenia won’t step back. What’s the exit in this case?
-Surely, the situation has entered into a deadlock. Everything depends on who will record a quicker development and will become an influential factor, interest of which will be taken into consideration. Recent period shows that Azerbaijan is becoming stronger, in particular, it succeeds passing resolutions in PACE, as compared to Armenia, its economy is developing well, and it’s becoming a country many transport substructures of regional importance are starting to operate on its territory. It’s not the case, that the situation lasted for 100 years. And then don’t forget that migration form Armenia took serious volumes, and further on it’ll have its reflection on the number of soldiers. Azerbaijan works that it may make use of this deadlock era in favor of it, and, as compared to Armenia, it succeeds.
By Gayane Khachatryan
