“New local war is probable, which will end with Moscow’s “peacemaking” mediation again”
Interview with Lilit Gevorgyan, Russia and CIS, Europe senior analyst at IHS Global Insight.
Judging from the statements by mediators and the parties to the conflict, certain developments have been recorded in NK conflict settlement, on which societies of both countries are unaware. First and foremost, U.S. Secretary of State J.Kerry stated that the presidents aren’t ready for the settlement. This was followed by remarks of Azerbaijani president, that behind the closed doors they are forced to recognize NK independence. These days he also gave an interview, stating that Azerbaijan’s membership to EEU isn’t excluded. He also informed that, “Mutual concession in NK conflict settlement is possible—it may become an autonomous republic.” What conclusion can be drawn from these statements —where the settlement process at this phase is and where does it go?
Judging from recent news, Baku-Moscow bargain after the April war is still in process. Obviously both sides didn’t completely come to an agreement, to which concessions Azerbaijan is ready instead of return of 5 regions, in particular, regarding integration with Russia.
Moscow obviously uses NK issue to strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus, making use of the fact that the West’s attention has recently more weakened towards the region. Azerbaijan should be brought under Moscow’s influence, after which Georgia will be more vulnerable. This plan by Moscow hasn’t changed. Main motive of ongoing negotiations is this very point, and not final settlement of NK conflict with Moscow’s mediation, which contradicts the latter’s interests, as Russian influence on Yerevan and Baku will strictly weaken.
However, Russia faces three main obstacles to favorably settle NK issue. This plan, in a simplified form, is the following: lands for NK’s certain status or Russian presence in NK, as well as Azerbaijan’s complete integration with Russia.
The first obstacle is that Azerbaijan is against possible Russian presence in NK and its independent status, as well as deep political and, particularly, military integration with Russia. On the other hand, it’s a serious obstacle to strict opposition of the Armenian society to any territorial concession and increasing anti-Russian moods against this background. Thirdly, the USA is also against the change of the status quo at the moment, realizing hidden threats behind the settlement, i.e. strengthening of Russia in the region. The USA and the EU, perhaps, prefer reflecting to the issue after the U.S. elections, when Washington’s foreign policy towards Russia and reflection of Putin’s Russia to those changes will be clarified.
NK is in isolated conflict from now on. It should be observed with Ukraine and Syria, as a circle of Russia-West relations. In these conflicts, in case of a tougher foreign policy by the U.S., Russia will be obliged to review its current confrontation line with the West. The main positive result of the cold war rhetoric is Putin’s high rating in Russia, however, it doesn’t have economic possibility to wage a Cold War. Russia’s economy isn’t even included in the top ten of world’s economy, and is even smaller, than e.g. that of South Korea as of 2015.
Thus it’s possible that Russia may go to concession, e.g. in Syria, instead, extracting concessions from the West, for instance, in the South Caucasus regarding NK issue. Thus, if the West agrees to accept the Caucasus as Russian zone of influence, this will allow settling NK issue through the Russian variant. In this case it’s not excluded that Azerbaijan will initiate war if the Armenian side doesn’t agree with this plan. This will be a rather hazardous development for Armenia and Georgia.
Conflict freezing and installation of security mechanisms may be another variant, to which Russia and Azerbaijan are currently against. This variant, perhaps, comes from Armenia’s interests and in some sense is in line with the U.S. However, more probably Azerbaijan will proceed and intensify its “exhausting” war. In this case regular invasions, daily ceasefire violations with use of heavier equipment are anticipated to Armenia. It’s not excluded either that Azerbaijan, by learning lessons from the April war and reviewing its military tactics, again will attack seriously, pursuing the purpose of taking one or more regions. Of course, this will be implemented through provision of the diplomatic front, i.e. together with ongoing negotiations with Russia.
Statement by RA Deputy FM that there is need to seriously review the concessions, which found their place in the Madrid Principles, was rather noteworthy. That observation definitely reveals posture of the Armenian side in negotiations. In your opinion, what does this suppose and how proper is it at this very stage?
There was a possibility of Madrid Principles review after the April war. Moreover, when Azerbaijan and Russia, basically, suspended confirmation of security mechanisms installation in the contact line, Armenia didn’t oppose and demand that the initiative by the U.S. on security mechanisms became a precondition for the negotiations. I consider the statement by the Armenian Deputy FM is simply a technical step. Yerevan attempts to show that it also can hold a tough position. However, one of the main points of Madrid and its further Russian variant is that Armenia principally agreed to concede territories to Azerbaijan. Moreover, Armenia agreed to develop negotiations without NK. This posture wasn’t reviewed after the April war. Thus, as soon as Azerbaijan agrees to Kazan principles, i.e. holding independence referendum in NK for seven regions, then Yerevan should agree and concede seven regions to Azerbaijan.
Judging from press releases, as compared to Armenia, throughout the years Azerbaijan submitted different demands during the negotiations and proposed alternatives from time to time, e.g. options of granting NK autonomy, cultural autonomy. On presidential level Armenia didn’t raise the issue of e.g. uniting NK to Armenia, of the territories of Shahumyan and former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which currently are under Azerbaijan’s control.
There is an impression that the Azerbaijani side is moving through the direction of discrediting the West in the settlement process, which supposedly means cooperation with Russia, particularly, on account of Kerry’s statement related to Karabakh was criticized both by Moscow and Baku. Is it possible that Baku and Moscow will attempt to “revenge” the USA in Karabakh, Moscow in Syrian and Baku in Karabakh conflicts for not pro-Azerbaijani position of the U.S., on account of the statement by Lavrov, that Turkey may play a positive role in NK issue settlement, in case when after the April war Russian authorities on the highest level were accusing Turkey in instigating Azerbaijan. What should be anticipated at this stage and how should we be cautious from Baku-Moscow-Ankara axis?
It was already clear in April that attack on NK wasn’t a Turkey-Azerbaijan deal. Statement by Lavrov confirmed it. Turkey has much more serious issues near its southern borders—in Syria and Iraq. Thus, it doesn’t have the intention of instigating war in NK or investing resources there, as Azerbaijani victory in NK, in particular, through Russian weapon and Russia’s active mediation, doesn’t solve Turkey’s primary national security issues.
Moreover, I consider, it’s been decades that Turkey-Armenia relations remain hostage to Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Ankara would like to free its relations with Armenia from NK issue, however, on account of its peculiar relations with Baku, as well as importance of national voters in domestic policy, Turkish authorities will continue supporting Azerbaijan. By giving a bigger role to Turkey, Russia, firstly attempts to use NK conflict for Russia-Turkey rapprochement at this stage and manifest goodwill to Ankara. This is more targeted against the West. Besides, Turkey’s participation in NK process through Russia’s goodwill will once again prove, that the leading power in the region is Russia.
Of course, Baku-Moscow-Ankara axis only makes Armenia’s diplomatic failure obvious. Yerevan has one strategic ally—Russia, and to advance its interests, this only strategic ally improves its relations with Armenia’s enemies on account of Armenia’s and NK’s security. This is expressed both by selling armaments to Azerbaijan and freezing processes of security mechanisms installation in the contact line, inviting Turkey to NK settlement process, as a result of which new casualties will be recorded in the contact line.
Regarding “repressive” operations in NK this is possible, more correctly, new local war is probable, which again will end with Moscow’s “peacemaking” mediation. As I mentioned, together with Ukraine and Syria, NK conflict is a lever for Russia in its relations with the West. By heating up these conflicts, Moscow reminds the West, that its isolation will only generate issues for the West. Minsk Group, Normandy Four (on Ukrainian issue) and Syrian negotiations are the formats, where Russia simply negotiates with the USA and the EU, sometimes adhering more constructive posture. However, it’s worth remembering that it’s not settled, but ongoing conflicts that provide Russia the opportunity to be a “global” actor.
Against the background of external and internal political developments in both countries the situation has sharpened in the contact line. How dangerous may the situation in the contact line be?
Unfortunately, years later NK issue is more probable to be settled militarily. Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides participated in negotiations, in fact, not being ready for the promised concessions. It’s another issue why the sides agreed on this negotiation format. Azerbaijan, that suffered military defeat in the 1990s, succeeded to freeze the conflict through negotiations. It used the ceasefire of 22 years, established an equipped army and developed balanced foreign policy. It succeeded to surprise the Armenian side in April and in any case, take new positions, dispersing the illusion that attack on the Armenian side will lead to more intensive counterattack and territorial losses for the Azerbaijani side.
Diplomatically Baku revealed Armenia’s diplomatic isolation, when neither of Yerevan’s allies, including, Russia, didn’t even criticize Azerbaijan for the April attack. Baku doesn’t act as a defeated side, but is a proactive and condition-imposing side. Moreover, the April war helped Azerbaijan to put an end to the status quo, which isn’t in line with its interests. Regarding domestic policy, war is also a productive tool for Aliyev, as against the background of economic decline its rating raised after the April war.
By Araks Martirosyan
