“When Trump’s administration glances at Karabakh, it’s won’t be beneficial to Yerevan, Baku and Moscow”
Interview with Grigory Trofimchuk, foreign affairs, security and defense expert, Russian analyst.
Mr. Trofimchuk, after the April war OSCE MG co-chairs worked actively, presidential summits have been recorded in Vienna, then in St. Petersburg, after which negotiations appeared at a deadlock again. Moreover, from November 10 the Azerbaijani side launched shelling on some parts of the contact line. Why did the situation appear at a deadlock again and are wide-scale operations anticipated?
The situation would inevitably appear at a deadlock, as negotiations launched after the April war was only a temporary measure ahead the lasting ceasefire. Throughout these negotiations concrete solutions should have been reflected, which, by the way, was insisted by Baku. Meanwhile, it’s November now, however, the situation is at the stage it was on April 6. No issue was solved as a result of Vienna and St. Petersburg meetings, in particular, there is no any clarity regarding which side attacked the first, who bears responsibility for the victims and economic losses.
This integrity of issues shapes new sharpening of the situation. Additional tension is observed also conditioned by the suspension, developed in the White House with the change of the president, which automatically pushes the USA focusing on solving its domestic issues. Moreover, it seems to them many, interested in negotiation activeness of NK conflict peaceful settlement, that everything has been settled for itself.
If top officials of Yerevan, Baku and Moscow met today with the intensiveness like in April, war threat would be eliminated. However, currently it seems to Baku, that on account of new stage of negotiations it was cheated again, and this pause allowed to essentially strengthen Armenian army, which obviously is more powerful, than it was on April 1, 2016.
In your opinion, how coordinated do the co-chairs work in negotiations, as recently Turkish FM stated, that essence of Russian initiative was that “Armenians should withdraw from the 5 regions,” and the USA offers “status for territories” formula? Doesn’t this mean that considerable differences in approaches are observed?
Currently OSCE MG has a status hanging in the air, as everybody is waiting for the new owner of the White House, and pursuant the non-voiced rule—almost the “owner” of the whole world. Due to this very reason there is no need speaking of coherence. As for “return of 5 occupied territories,” they attempt to link that thesis with Russia, when it didn’t state on it. By that the atmosphere of exerting pressure over Russia is established, which is almost convinced unjustifiably that Moscow will soon betray, as if it’s concerned over “conceding” of those “5 regions” to Azerbaijan, to calm the latter down.
In fact, there are no likewise plans, as principally there is no any clarity. There is only intention to return the issue to more or less serene stage on account of formal negotiations. The USA has its own position regarding this issue, however, that position is no more linked to the quitting administration.
In general, I consider, the West’s position is that Karabakh was given the status of a new state in the South Caucasus, at the same time to control Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. By the way, Karabakh’s statement on being renamed as “Artsakh Republic” totally fits in these plans, as such name automatically frees the disputed territory from the last Azerbaijani roots, existent in abbreviations NKR (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and NKAR (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region).
From Baku’s perspective renaming Karabakh was also a provocative step, as these developments, let me remind once again, are taking place under the ceasefire, established in early April. Meanwhile, new naming isn’t included in declarations neither of Vienna, nor of St. Petersburg. At the same time, the bid of the republic with a new name speaks of the fact that Karabakh pretends to assume the role of becoming a party to negotiations.
After the U.S. Secretary of State announced that there is no ground for NK conflict settlement, as the sides aren’t ready, Azerbaijani president gave an interview to Dmitry Kiselyov, not excluding Azerbaijan’s membership to EEU. Some Armenian experts consider if this diplomatic hint isn’t clarified, it’ll appear to be a proposal for a deal, “We’ll agree depending on what we’ll have instead.” How realistic is such a deal between Baku and Moscow?
Theoretically there is a possibility of EEU-Azerbaijan rapprochement. There is nothing extraordinary in it, as Baku initiated move towards the East in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with a stronger status. Besides, Baku-West current relations are rather tense, which also pushes Azerbaijan to the opposite—Eurasian direction. However, the main issue of Azerbaijan to engage with EEU is Karabakh. Due to this very reason it already gives signals to Moscow that it’s ready to observe the issue of Eurasian integration only in case of clarity around Karabakh. Baku is even ready for a compromise, which was Russia’s president calling and stating that it agrees on Karabakh’s autonomous status within Azerbaijan.
Now it’s Moscow’s turn. In any case, Azerbaijani president anticipates clear comment from Moscow. By the way, Washington is convinced, that there will be no deals around this issue, as Armenia is also here, which exclusively has contradicting position on Karabakh’s reintegration. Thus, if Azerbaijan’s move to the EEU is launched, at the same time, Armenia’s move from EEU may be observed with the help of the West.
What do you think, what’s the way to come out of the deadlock, urging Azerbaijan to implement agreements reached in Vienna and St. Petersburg?
I think there is no way out from this deadlock. The only variant is union of the three countries—Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in quite a new integration union, as even within EEU they won’t succeed to do it. EEU doesn’t do politics, moreover, with such territorial conflict like Karabakh, EEU covers the field of economy. It’s possible to come out of negotiation deadlock only by temporarily raising negotiations to an intensiveness level, like it was in early April. However, throughout the few months of resumed active negotiations, practical solutions should be found and formulated.
The point is that after the decline of the temp of negotiations many don’t even remember what was concretely proposed to the sides in Vienna and St. Petersburg. In fact, everything should be started anew, however, it’s less probable, that nerves can resist. Azerbaijan already fails to control its nerves and it doesn’t hide that. Let me also note, that Baku clearly changed its attitude towards Armenians, attracting a range of social figures to its side. From political perspective this is a rather unusual step by Azerbaijan, as formerly absolute intolerance was observed, even if Armenia doesn’t consider that group of Armenians a worthy “material,” i.e. some tactical changes are observed.
The U.S. president has changed. In your opinion what policy may be anticipated from Trump towards the South Caucasus, NK conflict and Russia on account of the fact that rather big enthusiasm is observed after the elections?
General tactical line will remain unchanged towards the South Caucasus, including regional issues, as well as in case of Ukraine and the EU. The newly elected president Donald Trump directly stated that they need powerful America, before which its partners should be accountable for each dollar. To be simpler, nobody is going to “feed” anyone for no reason. Issues, which will be possible to solve in the region on account of economic pressure, will be solved through that very way, as such an approach is close to Trump as a businessman. In my conviction, Russia didn’t need to engage so actively with the election process, as it isn’t a fact that in the final result Trump will be simpler and more positive in a range of crucial issues, than Hilary Clinton would be. Just the contrary, a businessman tends to solve the situation through force where the political figure prefers flexibility. Currently Karabakh is yet maximally far from the sight of the new administration, however, when he glances at Karabakh, to all likelihood, it won’t be beneficial to Yerevan, Baku and Moscow.
However, that would be strange having hopes with it, moreover, when after elections certain weakening of Armenian lobby is observed in the USA. On the other hand, the new administration would prefer that someone paid to them and not the contrary. Thus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia may currently attempt to “buy” Karabakh in Washington.
By Araks Martirosyan
