“Deepening of Iran-Armenia relations will restrict Russia’s monopolistic position in Armenia”

Interview with Movses Keshishyan, editor-in-chief of “Araks” weekly.

Mr. Keshishyan, particularly after the big agreement around Iran’s nuclear deal, necessity and possibility of realization of total potential of Armenia-Iran relations are being much touched upon. It was finally confirmed that Iran’s president Hasan Rouhani will visit Armenia in December. What should be anticipated from that meeting?

Expectancies are conditioned by our wishes and will. If we keep on staying within words, there is no need to anticipate any result. Practical steps are necessary to take and agreements should be brought to the field of implementation. Fortunately, rather wide field of deepening of the relations of the two is available, which should lead to the point to be able to possibly move forward Armenia’s interests, which in the fields of both politics and economy will be positively reflected in Armenia. Fortunately, the Iranian side treats the issue positively, and international, particularly, regional changes provide us the opportunity to have more results from Armenia-Iran relations, if we have such a will.

Which factors condition existence of that political will in case of Armenia?

It’s a fact, that there are no totally independent countries in the world, countries are connected to one another, spread activities with one another, which generates certain dependencies. And if a country links all its issues to the other, it completely loses its will. If the Armenian Government wishes to push Armenia forward, open a field before Armenia’s economy and politics, it should be able to use all its possibilities. By saying possibilities I mean establishment of equal relations with the states. Any country shouldn’t be given a monopolistic status. Today, unfortunately, we realize and see the brakes, which the Russian side may send. This is the issue, referring to both economy and politics.

Deepening of relations with Iran, which is a bordering country to Armenia and has rather common interests with Armenia, will restrict Russia’s monopolistic position. Surely, if such a will is manifested, the result will be observed as well. This isn’t the issue in which results may be recorded by slogans. Practical steps are necessary to take, i.e. if you agree around gas, diameter of the pipeline isn’t formed through pressures, despite the Russian “Gazprom’s” monopolistic position in the field of Armenian energy.

Provision of Iranian gas to Armenia, transition through the territory of Armenia provides opportunities to the latter of maneuver in the very gas price. It’s not restricted by that only. As soon as Armenia will be able to transit gas to Europe, both countries will benefit from it, as a result of which Armenia will strengthen its economy and will be able to pursue more powerful policy.

Is Azerbaijan a likewise factor for Iran, like Russia in case of Armenia, as Iran-Azerbaijan rapprochement has been observed, although distrust has always dominated in these relations?

Iranian interests can’t be sacrificed to interests of another country. It’s clear that the Iranian side intends to maintain good relations with all its neighbors. Iran’s this position is best observed in Iran’s approach on NK conflict: its position is balanced and neutral, the same may be observed in economic ties as well. The Iranian side constantly insists that it intends to expand its relations with all the countries, in particular, with the neighboring countries. Of course Christian and Muslim differences don’t prevent that. Azerbaijan isn’t that powerful to have the role of the brake.

We should also take into consideration that policy pursued by Azerbaijan with Israeli authorities, purchase of Israeli armaments, Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, Azerbaijan’s policy regarding the Islamist movements, all this provides the opportunity to the Iranian side to properly assess Azerbaijan as a neighbor, and it’s not so that Azerbaijan may brake Iran. From time to time anti-Iranian conferences are being held, which strive to move forward the policy of separating Iran’s northern part from Iran, and these don’t slip the attention of Iranian authorities. At the same time, politics supposes relations with all the countries, which Iran does.

So, in Armenia-Iran relations “the ball is in Armenia’s court.”

I consider, we—Armenians, the authorities don’t have the right to leave the issue as it is, when it refers to Armenian interest, i.e. “the ball can’t be kept in the Armenian court.” Let me mention this doesn’t mean at all, that the Iranian side perfectly implements are necessary steps to improve relations with Armenia, however, we can’t demand steps from Iran, when we haven’t implemented ours.

The Armenian side should send signals that it’s ready to develop relations with its neighbors, have alternatives to Russian monopoly. Of course, this doesn’t mean anti-Russian policy. It’s clear that it should maintain good relations with all the countries, these aren’t factors contradicting to one another, an alternative is always important for the states. The “ball” shouldn’t be kept, the step should be taken and necessary steps from the opposing side should be required.

Recent acquisition was the memorandum signed between the sides in late October and early November on gas sales, purchase and transit, by which small volume supplies to Georgia are anticipated, which, according to the talks, has been agreed with “Gazprom,” however, more global programs are being discussed, which relate to the possibilities of transmitting Iranian gas through Armenia and Georgia to Europe. How interesting is this perspective to Iran?

You know, that Iranian gas reaches Europe from Turkey. Currently policy pursued by the Turkish authorities, in particular, anti-Kurdish, anti-Iranian activities in Syria and Iraq, create a situation, that Iran begins to consider on alternatives. The more that alternative is with a more friendly country, the more trustworthy it may be for Iran. And Armenia may be reliable for Iran if Armenia’s authorities go to that. Fortunately, the Iranian side strives to make use of Armenia’s territory to transmit Iranian gas to Europe. That transit project refers to both gas and other production. Iran is also interested in Armenia’s presence in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), if Armenia is able to bring Iranian production to Eurasian market, both Iran and Armenia will benefit from that. The Iranian side is observing these possibilities.

I want to attach attention on another crucial point as well, although Turkey-Iran contradictions, Turkish authorities day after another work towards involving Iranian businessmen, scientists—they give citizenship, create conditions for Iranians to invest in Turkey, and etc. We, Armenians, don’t make use of this possibility, and we seem to be restricted on one point. Meanwhile we have a wider field to work with Iran, which we aren’t doing.

Armenia’s authorities relate to the Russian factor in the form of pressure, i.e. they get pressure, signals regarding which steps aren’t preferable to Moscow. In your opinion, how may this influence be reduced?

However, the authorities pursue their policy themselves. Can pressures totally lack? As much as we are oppressed, the more we have the right to protect our interest, i.e. go against. If we go back to the April war: who provided armaments to Azerbaijan? How Azerbaijan entitled itself to attack on Armenia? Was that the initiative by Azerbaijan alone?

These are questions, which we should look with open eyes. If existent conditions in Armenia didn’t boost anti-Russian moods, would we have Iskanders?—No. That’s the point. Both the people and the authorities don’t demand correctly, we have the issue of demanding our rights. If we do it correctly and pursue our interests, we’ll have what we want. Alternatives should be provided, which will narrow the possibility for pressures. The Armenians should urge their will.

By Araks Martirosyan