“Keys to Artsakh are in Stepanakert, and are called will and readiness to defend their freedom”
Interview with Artur Martirosyan of Boston, Senior Consultant, CMPartners, a negotiation specialist.
What’s the situation like today around Karabakh conflict? How should negotiations be resumed, when agreements reached in Vienna and St. Petersburg remain on the paper, Azerbaijan proceeds with bellicose statements, and OSCE MG co-chairs called in Hamburg—respect those agreements, again addressing to both sides—Yerevan and Baku?
There are 3 ways in negotiation jiu-jitsu to bring the other side to the negotiation table. First, shaping a frame of interests, so that the other side saw it may gain more it currently has. Second, draw a frame of losses i.e. firmly show the other side what it may lose if it withdraws from negotiations. And the third way is the combination of the first and the second ways by certain strategic sequence. In our case the first way is impossible in practice, even if some political figures in our country consider that “territories for peace” formula may operate.
Just the contrary, it increases trust of the other side, that its tough position works successfully, and it should be more toughened, i.e. increase military alternative towards negotiations, as final purpose of the adversary is not return of some territories and establishment of peace, but returning Artsakh under its possession.
Talks on concession of territories, even for establishing peace and recognition of the status is possible, however, it presupposes not only availability of tools exerting peace, but also a political will to use those tools, if the other side refuses the package, which takes into account interests of the sides without intervention of mediators or their sanctions, which is less probable. The second way is left, which means weakening of military alternative by the adversary or exclusion, which is better.
It’s not such an easy way, full of risks, requiring mobilization of all resources and possibilities, however, in a long-term perspective it’s the only correct way under the existent situation. The adversary will come to the negotiation table, and without its imitation, but for other purpose—establishing peace, when their main alternative to negotiations—military one, will be nullified. And as long as they hope for a military settlement, nothing will change.
President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan announced in Karabakh, that hard times are ahead. In your opinion, when will Baku initiate another escalation?
No one can state a clear date. But if we imagine us in Aliyev’s position, and the negotiator—as a chess player, he should be capable of doing it very well, and from his tower the following conditions are necessary: critical military superiority, serious worsening of socio-economic condition, which will require diversion of public attention to war and presence of favorable external conditions. The first and the last conditions depend on what we’ll do regarding security (also economic) and diplomacy. Worsening of socio-economic condition in Azerbaijan is inevitable and strictly depends on fluctuations of oil prices and its reserves.
In the period of the forthcoming 5-7 years reserves will decrease more sharply. Those calculations are enshrined in oil contracts of Azerbaijan and international corporations. On the whole, president Sargsyan is correct, when he says it’ll be difficult and they should be regarded totally armed in direct and indirect senses. At the same time, I support more active and initiative position—we should change the game so that the adversary may guess when the preventive blow will be recorded.
The first president of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced at ANC meeting that the key to Karabakh is in Moscow. How would you comment on this?
One can’t but agree with the first president that Moscow has considerable tools for leverage on the parties to the conflict. However, keys to Artsakh are in Stepanakert and are called will and readiness to defend their own freedom. Both Moscow and from Washington to Brussels, Ankara or Tel Aviv other external actors have their own interests. They may partially coincide, be simply different, and finally, contradict to our interests.
Issue of our diplomacy and the Diaspora is intensifying shared interests and neutralize those opposing. It’s difficult, our work is yet assessed as 3, and in the forthcoming decade everything, which will be less than 5, will mean failure of exams in national statehood vitality. One shouldn’t remain in the last rows with 3 marks.
Armenia is entering an active pre-election stage, and Karabakh issue has always been a crucial playing card in Armenia’s domestic policy. What developments should be anticipated to that end?
Attempts of politicizing Artsakhi issue are natural for the electoral stage. And it’s rather disappointing, that our power, first and foremost, depends on our ability to reach national consensus in crucial foreign policy issues. I’m not that naïve to suppose that all the political parties in Armenia may have a common position, but such unity referring to issues of war and peace is both possible and extremely desired.
For that political culture of a dialogue, listening to the parties and capability of coming to an agreement for a shared interest, and agreeing to disagree in not such crucial issues are necessary. I may only say to the voters—don’t believe in the political powers, promising speedy and simple solution in NK issue. We should pass the difficult way, however, I believe in our national capability of mobilization against a deadly threat. It happened during Sardarapat, Shushi. We can’t afford new “Karses.”
President of Iran stated in Yerevan that NK conflict doesn’t have a military solution and should be settled in a peaceful way. What influence may Tehran have on Baku in case of active development of relations with Armenia?
Iran is a very crucial partner and neighbor in many dimensions—trade, transport, energy, geopolitics. I read the statement by Rouhani in Yerevan as a standard diplomatic formulation, in other context— Netanyahu’s visit to Baku. In that triangle the situation directly influences on our interests. For this reason in the forthcoming years many-sided gentle jewelry work will be required from the Armenian diplomacy to defend our interests in case of unfavorable scenarios, and in particular, in case of Iran, above which clouds are gathering again.
Donald Trump was elected as president of the USA. What developments do you anticipate in Armenia-USA relations?
In case of Trump the fog began to dissipate in his Cabinet together with appointments. And although intentions of possible course of the foreign policy are obtaining new clear transaction shaping, the most predictable thing of 100 days of Trump is his unpredictability. His inauguration ceremony hasn’t been launched yet, and relations with China are already tense. Does this mean that relations will worsen?
To answer this question it’s necessary to have a clear view of Trump’s style of negotiating. It’s peculiar to him—start trade from the position of high claims, touch upon the point of “breaking” the other side, so that it receives a more favorable agreement, at the same time “not breaking” the other side and providing it clearly beneficial acquisition. Yet now in this regard from the position of improving relations with Russia, it may be supposed that probably, e.g. it may use its position with Moscow to “squeeze” the maximum from its allies for getting beneficial conditions in trade and security price. Trump can’t bear “parasites” and it seems to him that the USA has carried them on its back since the Cold War.
The majority of analysts agreed, that during Trump’s presidency the USA will decrease its position of a global leader, will more pursue economic interest, won’t be involved in projects of building other states by its example. Several challenges are linked to that positioning, when the Trump administration and his supporters may step back from the situational influence of lobbyists to record short-term benefits. To avoid negative implications of such scenarios it’s already necessary to mobilize all the resources of the diaspora, and such are available for working with his regime and supporters.
Other problematic situation announced by Trump, and not for us, is review of the nuclear deal with Iran. It won’t be easy for him to do that, however, he has clearly shaped that intention.
By Gayane Khachatryan
