“Can you imagine in case of which war Yerevan will decide to use “Iskander” toward Baku”
Interview with Vadim Dubnov, Russian diplomat, political analyst at “Echo of the Caucasus” (Prague).
Mr. Dubnov, in the period of recent one month the situation has considerably sharpened on NK line of contact. On February 25 even the Azerbaijani side launched attack simultaneously in two directions—southern and eastern. For which developments should the Armenian sides be ready?
I realize the conflict has entered a new stage after the escalation recorded in April 2016. However, I don’t realize what happened on February 25 and which the primary reasons of the occurrence were. I consider, any of the parties to the conflict may have its motives for the escalation. I can’t understand how Azerbaijani soldiers died during recent developments.
In any case, I believe what happens on Karabakh-Azerbaijan line of contact is an activation of mutual provocation, and it’s difficult for me to say who takes the first step, who starts tension, as this is a type of confrontation, when any side is ready to reply to provocation of the other side, being ready to take the first step.
It’s rather dangerous, as all this can lead to armed clashes on Karabakh conflict zone, however, I don’t consider wide-scale military operations, lasting war may be touched upon. I consider at the moment there is a brink, which has been clarified during the last April developments, repetition of such scenario is possible, however, principally more important, lasting and bloody war currently is excluded.
Why?
I believe, the sides aren’t ready for that, moreover, they don’t want such a scenario. Real wide-scale war isn’t involved in the upcoming plans neither of Armenia, nor of Azerbaijan.
In your opinion, which mechanisms of restraint does the Armenian side possess? Recently Armenian Defense Minister Vigen Sargsyan stated if necessary, Armenia will use “Iskander”. First, why was such a statement made, if official Yerevan has such an intention, will it be able to implement without Moscow’s consent? Will the last component—existence of “Iskander” in Armenia, keep Azerbaijan back from a wide-scale attack?
Statement by Vigen Sargsyan should be observed within information confrontation, naturally. As for real use of “Iskander”, I can’t imagine that under current tension anyone will think over using “Iskander” on the line of contact.
Do you imagine in case of which war Yerevan will make a decision to shell Baku by this complex, and Moscow supports that program? I consider it’s absolutely unrealistic at least now and in near future. As for agreement with Moscow, in this case the word “consent” is a rather delicate qualification, as asking for permit will be touched upon.
The situation is rather tense and OSCE MG isn’t really able to approach positions of the sides, certain activeness isn’t observed linked to recent developments in case, when experts insisted that the April war will be a lesson for OSCE MG. why are the mediators passive? What should they do under current state of affairs?
OSCE MG should does what it has done throughout recent 20 years: it should attempt to put down the fire—local outbreaks, hearths of possible wider confrontation, naturally introducing this all as a global process of settlement, in which, of course, no one believes. Why isn’t activeness observed? I consider there is certain work, they prepare presidential meeting, certain events, moreover, what should and can they do? To some extent backstage conversations are taking place, which all lead to the issue of putting down local outbreaks.
In case of another wide-scale escalation how will Moscow manifest itself? There are opinions that some coldness is observed in Moscow-Baku relations, as according to those allegations, Baku is attempting to sharpen the conflict, which isn’t in line with Russia’s interests, and Lavrov’s well-known tough reply to Azerbaijani reporter was conditioned by this. Will you reflect to Baku-Moscow relations?
I don’t consider that we may touch upon existent tension, uncertain conditions may be observed in all bilateral relations, however, I don’t consider there is a possibility for Armenia to change Moscow’s position in this conflict. Yerevan shouldn’t have illusions, that Russia’s attitude will so change toward Azerbaijan, which will allow Armenia record wider military and political success.
What’s your assessment to the fact that after the scandalous developments around Lapshin’s extradition Azerbaijan included three MEPs in the internationally wanted list? Did Lapshin’s extradition become a precedent?
I don’t consider it has become a precedent. Why? It was a well-calculated propagandist step, as it was rather scandalous and stormy, other steps and replies didn’t follow it, however, I consider Lapshin’s case fully complies with post-Soviet space traditions.
It’s clear that no one will be extradited to Azerbaijan from Europe, any candidate in Lapshin’s role. In the post-Soviet space an attitude has been developed toward the law, that anything may be implemented, qualifying it as a precedent.
By Araks Martirosyan
